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Given the imperfections in markets for technology, foreign direct investment (FDI) has 
been regarded as a channel for the transfer of technologies from developed to 
developing countries. FDI was expected to generate technological spillovers through 
vertical linkages with host-country firms and through involuntary leakages. Evidence 
suggests that inward FDI was a weak channel for technology transfer. with only limited 
spillovers in developing countries. With the wave of globalization that started in the 
1980s, trade in disembodied technology has boomed. Some large firms in developing 
countries have also acquired technology through outward foreign investment, typically 
through acquisitions of firms with a portfolio of technology products. Reinforcing these 
channels for technology acquisition by developing country firms merits active policy 
interventions.  
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1. Traditional modes of technology acquisition  
Acquisition of technology is a vital element of the competitive business strategy of firms 
in developing countries. Technology acquisition can reduce the productivity gap 
between developed and developing countries, and even more so if acquired 
technologies diffuse into wider use within developing countries. To the extent that the 
income gap across countries is sensitive to the technology gap, understanding the 
channels for technology flow are of great policy relevance. 
Acquisition of technology involves transfer of knowledge. This transfer might be in 
embodied forms, with technology incorporated in plant and machinery, or even 
embodied in the form of technical personnel. Alternatively, the transfer could be in 
disembodied forms, such as the provision of intangible technical services. While some 
elements of technology are codifiable in blueprints and designs, or articulated in 
patents, other crucial elements may be ‘tacit’, captured only in the general know-how 
and experience of those who operate the technology. These different types of 
technological knowledge lend themselves in varying extents to conventional market 
exchange. Technology embodied in plant and machinery or that codified into a patent 
may be acquired quite readily through arms-length market transactions. However, 
where technology takes the form of tacit knowledge or general know-how, market 
transactions are poor channels for technology transfer. 
There are well-known reasons why markets for technology do not always work well. 
One, to the extent that technology represents knowledge, sometimes the mere 
description of an idea, or sale of an object that incorporates that idea, amounts to a 
complete transfer of that knowledge itself. Arrow termed this as the ‘paradox of 
disclosure’. This characteristic can interfere with conventional market transactions 
unless supported by the enunciation of intellectual property rights (IPR). Even then, not 
all elements of technology can be protected, and even when patent protection is used, it 
may be hard to enforce it. Two, and partially as a corollary of the above, those hoping to 
acquire technology might have only a poor idea of which out of a competing set of 
technologies will meet their needs and/or where it might be available. Think of this as 
the problem of ignorance. A third problem comes from the non-rival nature of 
information – that its use by one person does not diminish the amount available for 
others to use. The ability of others to copy or duplicate technology makes it hard to 
prevent the resale of transferred technology: this problem of appropriability may 
inhibit the initial transfer of technology. Lastly, there is the problem of absorptive 
capacity, in that even those who acquire technologies may struggle to deploy it 
productively. All these features limit the extent to which technology can be transferred 
across firms and countries through arms-length market transactions. 
Where market-based technology transactions across firms do not work, technology 
could always be transferred across countries but within the boundaries of a firm. For 
instance, a multi-national enterprise (MNE) from a developed country could invest in a 
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manufacturing facility in a developing country. This direct investment might circumvent 
the problems of disclosure and ignorance, but the transfer would remain vulnerable to 
the risk of imitation from local rivals. If the host-country institutional environment 
afforded greater protection for intellectual property rights, so that leakage is restrained, 
an MNE parent would be more willing to transfer more technology to its overseas 
subsidiary. A porous regime would reduce the incentive to transfer the most valuable 
technologies, even though there is greater diffusion of that which is transferred. 
Thus, conventional wisdom suggested two major channels for the acquisition of 
technologies of developing countries. In some situations, and for some forms of 
technology, there might be scope for outright arms-length technology acquisition, 
through purchase of technology licenses or capital that embodies technology. Where 
this is not a viable channel, a developing country eager to acquire technology could 
adopt a more permissive attitude to inward foreign investment, and especially in 
technology-intensive sectors.   
The traditional view is well encapsulated in Archibugi and Pietrobelli (2003) who 
distinguish between three sources of global technology generation (and potentially 
technology acquisition) for developing countries. Developing country firms could 
participate in the international exploitation of nationally produced technology such as 
occurred in the case of Korean component manufacturers and Japanese cars or Indian 
software producers and US firms. Both would involve some sort of international 
licensing activity as well as production on contract for the foreign firm. Alternatively, 
they could participate in the global generation of innovation (by MNEs) by providing tax 
incentives for their location and an amenable infrastructure for knowledge-based work. 
Lastly, developing countries could increase their share of global technological 
collaborations. They argue that globalization provided huge opportunities for 
participation by developing country firms in all three forms of technology generation 
(by developed economy firms).  In turn, such participation could provide fertile ground 
for technology acquisition activities by developing country firms.   
 
2. Limitations of technology acquisition through licensing and FDI 
Licensing proved to be a poor channel for technology acquisition in the early decades 
after the Second World War, and largely failed to bridge the technology gap between 
developed and developing countries. A large number of studies identified why this 
might have been so. One, developing country firms lacked information about the set of 
available technologies and did not always choose the technology most appropriate to 
their needs (Fransman 1985). Two, firms could buy a technology license but, in the 
absence of appropriate domestic R&D, they often lacked the complementary 
infrastructure of intermediate goods and services needed to operationalize the acquired 
technologies (Dahlman 1978; Lall 1983; Westphal, Kim, and Dahlman 1985). Three, the 
‘know-how’ to make the necessary adaptations required tacit understanding of the 
technology (the ‘know-why’), which could not be fully contracted for. Firms that made 
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an effort to invest in technology (e.g. through internal R&D) were better able to learn 
and master acquired technologies but some saw acquired technology as a substitute for 
their own R&D (Bell and Pavitt 1997, Archibugi and Pietrobelli 2003). As a result, 
successful technology transfer was limited to firms and countries with not too 
dissimilar technological capabilities, or at least where the technology gap was not too 
large relative to the absorptive capacity of the firms acquiring the technology. Where 
the technology gap was large, licensing failed as a mode of technology acquisition in the 
developing world.   
Of course, international labour mobility may well have aided the transfer of technology. 
Historical evidence for an earlier era, namely the Inter-War years, documents the role 
played by the movement of scientific personnel as carriers of know-how and tacit 
knowledge in the transfer of technology from Europe to the USA (Mowery and 
Rosenberg 1989; Athreye and Godley 2009). These studies revealed that the informal 
aspects of technology transfer, such as knowledge and networks that were associated 
with particular people, were as important as the formal elements. Reduced mobility of 
scientists in the post-War period made this type of people-embedded technology 
transfer less common, especially to developing countries.1 To some extent, international 
joint ventures and strategic technology partnering could have filled this gap. Narula and 
Sadowski (2002) analyse data on technological collaborations to find that developing 
countries accounted for only 6.9% of all technology agreements in 1997 and that over 
90% of these agreements involved only developed economy firms.   
In principle, the mobility of capital could help transfer technology even in the face of 
low labour mobility. Where developing countries acquire new technologies through 
inward FDI, the parent MNE would have standard ownership incentives to ensure the 
effective transfer of technology and essential know-how to their overseas venture. Thus 
technology-imbued FDI could transfer technology where arms-length transfers were 
weak. Although it is now commonplace to see developing countries embrace FDI, 
attitudes to foreign capital were somewhat ambivalent in the immediate post-War 
period. A long history of colonial stifling of indigenous industrialization had left newly-
independent developing countries with a reflexive suspicion of foreign capital. MNEs 
were seen as foreign monopolies that would foreclose investment opportunities for 
domestic industry and, at the macroeconomic level, repatriation of profits would strain 
precarious foreign exchange balances.  
Economic policy in India epitomized this approach: Athreye and Kapur (2001) discuss 
the vicissitudes of FDI policy that tried to restrain foreign ownership even as it sought 
to enhance the arms-length technology acquisition necessary for establishing a 
                                                          
1 Trends in mobility changed again after the 1980s when many countries began to pursue a policy of 
selective immigration, with notions of brain gain and brain circulation gaining currency. Archibugi and 
Pietrobelli (2003) report that, with greater funding for scholar exchanges, there has been a small increase 
in the share of scientific papers with developing country co-authors — from 15.8% of all co-authored 
papers in 1986-88 to 19.2% of all co-authored papers in 1995-97.  
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domestic industrial base. However, such attempts to disentangle technology transfer 
from foreign ownership failed. As policy makers found that foreign firms would not 
transfer advanced technologies without large ownership shares, a more permissive 
regime for MNEs came to be regarded as a vital compromise to enable technological 
catch-up. With the growing realization that previous restrictions of foreign investment 
had choked off access to technology and also stifled competition in many sectors, the 
earlier ambivalence had been discarded by the late 1980s. Increasingly, developing 
countries came to the view that the presence of MNEs would expose local firms to 
advanced technologies and production processes through demonstration effects, 
leading to spillovers that could boost the productivity of firms in their proximity, be it 
proximate in a geographic sense or industrial sense.  
Blomström and Kokko (1998) identified three channels for information and knowledge 
transfer between foreign MNEs and domestic firms.  One, the inevitable mobility of 
domestic workers from more productive foreign firms to host-country firms would 
generate technological spillovers (Fosfuri, Motta, and Rønde 2001; Glass and Saggi 
2002; Görg and Strobl 2005). Two, vertical linkages whereby domestic firms competed 
to supply inputs to foreign firms can raise the productivity and technological 
capabilities of domestic suppliers (Barba Navaretti and Venables 2004; Crespo and 
Fontoura 2007; Smarzynska Javorcik and Spatareanu 2008; Giroud, Jindra and Marek 
2012). Automobile manufacture provided a classic example of this second channel, as 
the manufacture of ancillary automobile components is usually sub-contracted to local 
firms. Zanfei (2012) identifies pecuniary externalities where increased demand for 
output of a particular firm can generate scale-related productivity advantages for the 
local industry. Three, there may be demonstration effects and imitative behaviour 
through reverse engineering, when domestic firms observing a superior management 
practice or technology at work may be induced to adopt it themselves: this represents 
the purest externality effect of foreign presence. 
Empirical evidence suggests that this view of technological externalities was simplistic. 
Several factors can limit beneficial spill-overs from foreign to domestic firms. One, while 
vertical linkages could trigger technological improvements among domestic input 
suppliers, the precise nature of these linkages is important. For instance, many foreign 
firms in the dragon economies of Asia had strong linkages with domestic firms, but this 
was less so in other countries and in some industrial sectors. Two, the process of local 
technological diffusion is sensitive to the intensity of local competition vis-a-vis foreign 
firms, and its success depends on the absorptive capacity of local firms. If domestic 
firms are very far behind the technology frontier, then they are both less able to absorb 
the superior technology brought in by MNEs and less able to compete with them. Over 
time such firms may even lose their market shares and help establish foreign monopoly 
enclaves in the industrial sector. Three, the motives behind the investment are 
important: where FDI is purely of a market-seeking intent, it might involve primarily 
the establishment of distribution and sales outlets in the developing country, with few 
technological linkages or knowledge exchange.  
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For these reasons, the expected gains of FDI-induced technology acquisition turned out 
to be over-optimistic. Notably, the factors that inhibit technology transfer associated 
with FDI are not dissimilar to the factors that inhibited technology transfer through 
licensing in the post-War decades. Where the technological gap between foreign and 
domestic firms was large relative to the absorptive capacity of domestic firms, 
technology acquisition was weak, whether through licensing or through anticipated 
spill-overs from foreign firms.  Low technology capability and inadequate technological 
infrastructure are common features of firms located in countries behind the technology 
frontier: the very outcome that inward FDI and technology licensing hoped to change. In 
some cases, large technology gaps created fertile conditions for the emergence of 
foreign-owned monopolies, which were likely to be more unpopular than domestic 
monopolies.  
That both licensing and foreign direct investment turned out to be poor channels for 
technology transfer is not surprising if we consider the motivation of foreign firms 
involved in the process. Many of these firms viewed the licensing of technology as a 
strategy to ‘enter’ overseas markets, alongside foreign direct investment or simply 
exporting their product (Telesio 1979, Calvet 1981, Porter 1986). Licensing and direct 
investment were not always substitutes; sometimes they complemented each other 
with common factors driving both. For instance, the difficulty of operating production 
facilities in remote developing countries might generate a preference for licensing but 
some accompanying equity participation may be necessary to protect proprietary 
technology from the risk of leakage. Host-country intellectual property regimes also 
influenced this choice: in countries where IPR protection was considered to be weak, 
MNEs preferred to establish subsidiaries rather than license their technology 
(Contractor 1981).  
 
3. Changes in modes of technology acquisition in the 1990s 
Amidst the general pessimism about difficulties of technology acquisition by developing 
countries, the 1990s saw two new trends.  First, there was an increase in the global 
volume of trade in technology services, with much greater involvement of developing 
countries as buyers and sellers. Second, more surprising, was the emergence of outward 
FDI from developing countries to developed countries – the latter especially has offered 
a new channel for technology acquisition by developing countries. Both of these 
developments represent a departure from the traditional modes of technology 
acquisition. We explore these trends in this section, relying on some case studies.   
The increase in cross-border technology trade 
 
As the OECD (2011) categorizes it, trade in technology comprises four types of 
transactions: transfer of techniques through patents and licenses and the disclosure of 
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know-how; transfer of designs; services with a technical content, including technical 
assistance; and industrial R&D. Not all of this trade is amenable to measurement. The 
volume of royalty and license fees (RLF) associated with technology trade has been 
reported on a regular cross-country basis since 1996, as these transfers are reported in 
balance-of-payments data. The use of these data as a proxy for trade in technology 
requires caveats. The value of RLF payments, especially intra-firm transactions, is 
distorted by transfer-pricing that aims to minimize the global tax liability of MNEs.2  
Figure 1 shows how cross-border RLF flows have accelerated since 1990, after a 
relatively flat trajectory in the post-War decades.  
 
Figure 1: Growth in international royalty and licensing payments and receipts 


























































































Sources: For the period 1950-70, we consulted The IMF Balance of Payments Yearbook (various years), 
which reports royalty and licensing fees in current USD by country. From 1970-2001, we used the World 
Development Indicators database which collates royalty and licensing revenues in current USD separately 
for each country (http://www.worldbank.org/data/onlinedatabases/onlinedatabases.html) 
 
Over the period 1990-2009, computations using World Development Indicators (WDI) 
data show that global royalty and licensing receipts and payments grew at an average 
rate of 9.9% per annum. To put this surge into perspective, this is higher than the rate of 
growth for world merchandise exports during 1992-2009, which at 7% per annum 
                                                          
2 Madeuf (1984) and OECD (1995: Box 12.1) contain a detailed discussion of the problems and 
limitations of using royalty and licence fee data to infer technology transfer. 
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(WTO, 2010) in nominal terms, is regarded as evidence of increased globalization.3 And 
this growth was quite universal: WIPO (2011) found that in almost all countries for 
which data are available, transactions involving royalties and license fees grew faster 
than their gross domestic product (GDP). While some of the rise in RLF flows may be 
overstated due to under-reporting or measurement issues in the pre-1990 period, even 
for the more recent period since 1999, global flows have risen at an average of 7.7% per 
annum in real terms. For the Russian Federation, China and India, international flows of 
royalties increased by more than 20% per annum between 1997 and 2009.  
The list of countries participating in this trade also grew.  In 1990, 62 countries made 
licensing payments but by 2007, this number had increased to 147 countries.  Similarly, 
in 1990, only 43 countries received any international royalty or license fees, but by 
2007, this number had increased to 143 countries. This suggests the gradual emergence 
of a large market in international licensing, perhaps facilitated by the growth of new 
industrializing economies of the BRICS and also the harmonization of IPR 
systems/regimes due to agreements like the Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS). 
 
Table 1: Royalty and License Fees (RLF) – receipts and payments by country groups in 
billions of US dollars; shares in global totals and average annual rates of growth  
Country Group 1999 2009 







All countries      
 RLF receipts 72.7 153.2   7.7% 
 RLF payment 77.4 153.1   7.1% 
High income countries      
 RLF receipt values  72.0 151.1 98.97 98.65 7.7% 
 RLF payment values  70.4 135.2 90.95 88.26 6.7% 
Middle income countries      
 RLF receipt values  0.7 2.1 1.01 1.34 10.8% 
 RLF payment values  6.9 17.9 8.96 11.72 10.0% 
Low income countries      
 RLF receipt values  .01 .015 0. 02 0. 01 1.0% 
 RLF payment values  .07 .033 0. 09 0. 02 -7.3% 
Source: Authors’ computations, using World Development Indicators database. Notes: (1) Values deflated 
using GDP deflator provided in the WDI. (2) Country groups used are World Bank categories. 
 
                                                          
3 Data from International Monetary Fund and World Development Indicators suggest that world exports 
stood at US $4.2 trillion in 1992 but steadily increased to $14.2 trillion by 2010, implying an annual 
average growth rate of 7% per annum. 
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Table 1 offers a more disaggregated picture, categorizing country by income groups.  
High-income countries are involved in the bulk of these flows, accounting for over 98% 
of all RLF receipts and over 90% of payments. The share of middle-income countries 
remains quite small but is rising briskly, at around 10% per annum for both receipts 
and payments. Although not reported here, within the middle-income group, the so-
called transition economies show higher growth of RLF receipts (20% per annum in 
nominal terms) relative to payments (13% per annum); the BRIC countries collectively 
show a higher rate of growth of RLF payments (21% per annum) relative to that of 
receipts (16%).4 The data also show that low-income countries are largely excluded 
from such trade in technology. 
Looking more closely at the countries that increased their share of international RLF 
payments between 2005 and 2009, we find Ireland and China increased their share by 
4.9% and 2.1%. Other new countries gaining shares in international licensing payments 
are the BRIC economies, and former East European nations like Hungary and Poland. 
Many of the BRIC countries also increased their shares in international licensing 
receipts, but large gains in exporting shares were made by European countries and 
South Korea.  
The evidence on increased RLF flows matches up quite well with findings on national 
R&D expenditures which may be seen as an indicator of national investment in 
technological capability. WIPO (2011) finds worldwide R&D spending is skewed 
towards high-income countries which still account for around 70 percent of the world 
total although their share dropped by 13 percentage points between 1993 and 2009. 
The share of middle- and low-income countries more than doubled between 1993 and 
2008; the most spectacular increase in the share of world R&D has been that of China, 
now the second largest R&D spender in the world. Other middle income countries that 
registered an increase in R&D spending include Brazil, Russia and South Korea.  
Recalling our earlier discussion, as firms in countries become technologically more able, 
they are also better able to search for technologies that can be licensed to their 
advantage. 
Nevertheless, the growth in international licensing was confined to a few industrial 
sectors in almost every country.  Data on industrial composition for this trade are hard 
to come by and researchers have instead looked at data from technology agreements of 
firms.  The Thompson Financials SDC Platinum database covers over 6,235 technology 
licensing agreements involving 7,006 firms between 1976 and 2009, and provides detail 
of the industrial sector, contract details (e.g., extent of exclusivity, lump-sum versus fee 
                                                          
4 These rates of growth are for nominal values.  Whilst we have used the GDP deflator in reporting real 
values such deflators do not work very efficiently for estimating the value of technology. 
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elements) and information on pairs of licensor-licensee pairs, details not found in 
aggregate data.5   
Gambardella and Torrisi (2010) provide some detail on the sectoral composition of 
licensing trade. They find that the majority of the licensing contracts in their sample 
occurred in IT-semiconductors-electronics, chemicals-pharmaceuticals-biotech and 
engineering technological classes. They also show that licensing tends to correspond to 
the country’s technology specialization indices as computed from patent databases. The 
sectors of licensing activity that emerge from the firm database are quite remarkably 
congruent and similar to those from previous studies on licensing (Caves, Crookell, and 
Killing 1983, Anand and Khanna 1996). The theoretical literature suggests that such 
concentration in particular sectors occurs when horizontal contracts prevail. This can 
happen when the technology is general purpose and applicable in different uses.   
Gambardella and Torrisi (2010) also use these data to shed light on the technology 
flows between sectors and this information is presented in Table 2.  As can be seen from 
Table 2, the largest flows of technology through licensing are, in fact, within the same 
technological sectors, although related sectors (such as chemicals and drugs and 
computers and electronic equipment sectors) benefit from licensing arrangements.  In 
addition, sectors like instrumentation and the knowledge-intensive business services 
(KIBS) sell to a range of other sectors.   

































































Drugs 64.8 3.7 0.4 0.2 0.1 4.6 11.7 1343 
Chemicals 16.9 42.8 1.9 3.3 2.5 4.4 9.4 362 
Computers 0.2 1.6 27.1 22.4 3.1 5.6 27.7 613 
Electrical equipment 0.8 2.1 17.0 46.4 1.0 4.9 20.5 800 
Transport 2.0 6.9 7.8 12.8 27.5 5.9 24.5 102 
Instruments 19.0 2.8 6.4 10.6 1.7 29.9 14.0 358 
Knowledge-Intensive Business Services 
(KIBS) 
10.6 2.4 9.8 10.4 1.2 2.7 45.6 1620 
 
Source: Based on Gambardella and Torrisi (2010), Table 4 and Table B.1 
 
 
                                                          
5 The data draws upon voluntary disclosure by firms of their technology agreements, which may also be 
driven by strategic concerns. 
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Outward FDI and technology acquisition  
A surprising feature of more recent globalization since the 1990s has been the 
emergence of outward FDI from many developing countries, especially Brazil, Russia, 
India and China (BRIC, for short).  By 2010 these countries accounted for 9% of global 
outward FDI flows: Figure 2 plots the trends in outward investments for these BRIC 
countries, with data drawn from the UNCTAD database. While outflows are not large in 
absolute terms, they display a growing trend, which for China and Russia persists even 
after the onset of the financial crisis.  
 
Figure 2: Value of outward FDI from BRIC countries, billions of US dollars 
 




While a fair chunk of these investment flows went to the developing countries, a 
significant amount of outward investment also went from these developing countries to 
developed countries. UNCTAD (2013) finds that between 2000-2008 as much as 42% of 
all investment from the BRICS countries (their list includes South Africa) went to 
‘Northern’ (i.e., developed) countries. Figure 3 shows the distribution of BRICS outflows 
by form of investment, ‘greenfield’ vs. mergers & acquisitions (M&A). UNCTAD (2013) 
reports that while most of the BRICS investment outflows to Africa were of the 




Figure 3: Form of outward FDI from BRIC countries during 2000-2008 (US$ 
billion): Greenfield investment vs mergers and acquisitions (M&A) 
 
 
Direct investment flows from developing to developed countries present a conundrum. 
Conventional economic theory suggests that capital should flow from capital-rich 
developed countries to capital-scarce emerging economies. Indeed, that was the 
prevailing pattern for much of the post-War period. And as capital-rich developed 
countries are technologically more advanced than developing ones, capital and 
technology flowed down together along the same gradient, from advanced to 
developing economies. In keeping with this scenario, from the viewpoint of developing 
countries, it was inward FDI that was expected to serve as a channel for technology 
transfer. Outward FDI from developing economies amounts to what has been described 
as the ‘uphill flow of capital’. Outward FDI (OFDI) may have a variety of motivations, as 
outlined in Athreye and Kapur (2009), ranging from a quest for critical natural 
resources, the desire to develop distribution channels to improve access to export 
markets, to simply geographic diversification of corporate assets. However, we are 
going to argue, at least some of this uphill flow was motivated by the desire to gain 
access to overseas technological assets.    
 13 
If uphill flows are to serve as a channel for technology acquisition, technology must flow 
in a direction opposite to that of capital. In well-functioning technology markets, such 
opposing flows of technology and financial resources could simply be an outcome of 
arms-length technology trade, in the form of licenses and royalty payments. In less-
than-perfect technology markets where technology-seeking firms lack the ability to 
identify the technological assets they need, or where the assets exist in tacit form, firms 
from developing countries must resort to the outright acquisition of technology-rich 
firms overseas. In acquiring these assets, firms gain access not only to a body of 
knowledge codified as patents, but also the human capital in established R&D facilities 
or networks, or simply embodied in production facilities or processes that cannot be 
easily replicated. Amighini, Rebellotti, and Sanfilipo (2010) survey the empirical 
evidence that OFDI has become a channel for technological catch-up. 
Where overseas investment is motivated by technology acquisition, it should be evident 
in the form and characteristics of the investment. One, if the aim is to acquire quick 
access to production or research facilities or associated human capital, investment will 
take the form of acquisition rather than the organic growth of a kind associated with 
greenfield investment. Furthermore, technology acquisition as a motivation for OFDI 
makes commercial sense only if the acquiring firm has significant interests in the 
relevant (or a related) industrial sector, either in the form of existing production 
capacity or the desire to set up new production capacity. Three, the outward investment 
must be in firms typically in regions which are seen to have a significant technological 
edge. 
Child and Rodrigues (2005) assess the extent to which desire to acquire strategic assets 
motivates the physical and organizational expansion of Chinese firms in overseas 
locations. While much of Chinese OFDI aims to secure access to raw materials, and some 
merely to improve access to overseas markets, they argue that at least one strand of 
such investment aims to correct for the competitive disadvantages of ‘late 
development’, notably the need to catch up with technology and know-how if they are 
to become global players. While joint ventures with foreign partners provided Chinese 
original equipment manufacturers with access to technology, including some tacit 
knowledge, typically these left the Chinese collaborators as the junior partners in the 
venture.6 Foreign acquisitions have allowed Chinese firms to get improved access to 
technology. For instance, in 2001 China’s Holly Group, which had previously specialized 
in the production of energy meter equipment, acquired from Philips Semiconductors in 
the US, its operational assets for CDMA handset reference designs used in mobile 
telephony. This acquisition gave Holly access to know-how and intellectual property 
rights, including an exclusive license for the CDMA software protocol. In 2004, the 
Chinese state-owned Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation acquired the rights to 
engine and transmission technology from the UK’s MG Rover Group, although it later 
                                                          
6 Van Reenan and Yeuh (2012) argue that Chinese joint-venture policy was a huge success as it conferred 
a TFP growth of 1% on all participating firms. 
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held off from outright acquisition of the group.  The Chinese firm Quianjiang acquired a 
motor cycle manufacturer, Benelli, in Italy, mostly for its R&D facilities. Lenovo’s 
acquisition of IBM’s PC division in 2005 gave it control over a key brand for marketing 
purposes, but also provided access to its technological assets. It then built on its earlier 
acquisition to make a bid for the IBM x86-server business: not only did this give Lenovo 
access to IBM’s servers and associated software, it also gave them control over a 
workforce of 7500 employees based in the US and other locations. 
India’s OFDI provides similar examples. Pradhan and Singh (2009) study the overseas 
investment of Indian firms in the automotive sector. Consider, for example the 
acquisition by the Tata Group of UK-based Jaguar Land Rover in 2008. Tata Motors, as 
part of the Tata Group, had been manufacturing automobiles in India since 1945. Its 
early focus was on commercial vehicles but in the 1990s it entered the market for 
passenger cars and light commercial vehicles by developing indigenous designs. These 
had only limited success but established the infrastructure for engineering design and 
development. In 2003 Tata announced a project to produce the Nano, an ultra-low-cost 
car based on domestic design and engineering. But crucially, this project was 
accompanied by what Bruche (2010) calls complementary upstream 
internationalization. It set up the Tata Motors European Technical Centre (TMETC) in 
Coventry, UK to work on what Tata identified as ‘critical gap’ areas, and did so in close 
cooperation with Tata Motors’ own research facilities in India.7 At the same time, one of 
the Tata subsidiaries that focused on automotive design-engineering acquired UK-based 
design services company INCAT International: this is a provider of engineering services 
to the automotive and aerospace industry, with 3000 employees in North America, 
Germany and India. Both entities were closely involved with Tata’s indigenous 
technological efforts, which included 37 patent applications in India. These 
technological precursors were followed by the purchase of UK’s Jaguar Land Rover 
(JLR) from the Ford Group in 2008. This acquisition represented a diversification into 
the market for premium vehicles but had a clear technological dimension, in the form of 
Jaguar’s two engineering design centres in the UK. 
Similar initiatives by Indian firms to acquire technology were evident in other sectors. 
Pradhan (2008) reports evidence on overseas acquisitions by Indian pharmaceuticals in 
their quest for technology. Historically, the domestic innovation activity of Indian 
pharmaceutical firms was limited to cost-effective process development rather than 
product development. Accordingly, a significant fraction of early Indian OFDI in this 
sector went to developing countries, especially Africa, largely to extend and secure 
markets. Since 2000, OFDI has been used to acquire strategic assets in the developed 
world, most notably in the US and UK. For instance, Ranbaxy Laboratories has made 
                                                          
7 As the managing director of Tata Motors Ltd (TML) put it, TMETC provided a window on advanced 
technologies allowing “TML to plug into the expertise that is available in Britain and be in on the key 
developments in automobile manufacturing.”  
See http://www.tata.com/article/inside/q63wqXlx5rc=/TLYVr3YPkMU= 
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significant investments in Europe, Japan and the US: not all of this was in the generic 
drug segments, long regarded as the strength of Indian firms. Another large 
pharmaceutical firm from India, Dr Reddy’s Laboratories, has made large investments in 
the UK and Germany. Clearly, acquisitions have had a variety of motivations, from pure 
market capture to improved ability to engage with host country drug-approval regimes 
through acquired proxies. Nonetheless, the technology-acquisition motivation is quite 
evident in contemporary corporate announcements.8 
Nayyar (2008) cites the acquisition of Hansen Transmissions International (a Belgium-
based manufacturer of turbine gearboxes) by Suzlon Energy from India, motivated by 
the desire to extend its capabilities in the manufacture of wind turbines,9 and other 
acquisitions in the telecommunications sector. Niosi and Tschang (2009) point to the 
importance of overseas acquisitions in the early development of software firms from 
India and China.  
While these case studies provide robust examples of technology acquisition through 
OFDI from developing countries, the salience of this motivation must not be overstated. 
Clearly, technology is an important consideration in many overseas acquisitions, but 
realistically it is not the only one, and in many cases not even the primary one. Buckley 
et al. (2007) found that the annual patent registration of the host countries – as a proxy 
for their technological intensity – was not a significant determinant of the level and 
direction of Chinese FDI outflows over the period 1990 to 2001. A lot of the investment 
had more direct and immediate objectives, such as securing access to key raw materials 
(oil, gas or minerals) or simply acquiring market shares. One could speculate on 
whether the motivation for internationalization evolved in more recent years – with the 
technology objective acquiring greater primacy – but it is quite likely that resource-
seeking or market-seeking flows swamp the few investments in search of technology 
However, the picture may be somewhat nuanced. Even when technology was not the 
primary motivation for acquisition, ex post it may have delivered technological 
dividends. For instance, in Lenovo’s acquisition of IBM personal computer segments, its 
established market brand was a major consideration, as it allowed it to convert its 
                                                          
8 For instance, as Pradhan (2008) cites, the corporate announcement at Reddy’s acquisition of 
Dowpharma UK noted: “The proprietary chiral and bio-catalysis technology at the Cambridge site and the 
scale-up capability in the Mirfield site will add significant value to the company. This acquisition will also 
bring strengths in industrial synthesis of complex prostaglandins and carbohydrate chemistry. These 
newer capabilities will add to our existing R&D and commercial infrastructure.” 
9 The corporate statement at that acquisition offered the following motivation: “The acquisition of Hansen 
gives us technological leadership and will make Suzlon a leading integrated wind turbine manufacturer in 
the world. Although the company will be run as an independent business unit, the acquisition of Hansen 
will allow us to integrate gearbox technology into the total turbine solution enabling a more reliable and 
competitive product,” and further that “with this acquisition Suzlon has truly emerged as a global player 
with significant market presence, manufacturing base and R&D centres across North America, Europe, 




existing manufacturing capacity into a larger market share. But even here, while it may 
not have been the initial objective, access to IBM’s production facilities served as a 
bridge to intellectual property rights in the server segment, and Lenovo control over its 
technology-rich work-force. 
Aggregate data show a close relation between the pace of outward investments and the 
hunger for technology through international licensing. Figure 4 plots the rise in 
licensing payments from the BRIC countries and compares it with the rise in technology 
payments by EU transition economies which globalized (albeit less aggressively than 
the BRIC countries). From 1999-2009 the share of international licensing payments of 
the BRIC countries increased from 4.2% to 10.2%.  In the same period OECD transition 
economies increased their share of international licensing payments from 1.5 to 2%. 
Figure 4:  Value of arms-length technology purchases, BRICS vs OECD 
transition countries (US$ million) 
 
Source: As for Figure 1. 
 
4. Impact of globalization on technology acquisition strategies 
The increase in international trade in technology and the emergence of OFDI as a new 
tool of technology acquisition raises the question of what factors lay behind these 
trends. We contend that the deep globalization that started in the late 1980s 
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contributed to both trends. Globalization saw a marked increase in the mobility of labor 
and capital, and the revolution in communications technologies served to reduce the 
knowledge gap across countries. By the 1990s, decades of post-War development had 
increased the technological capabilities and absorptive capacity of many firms in 
developing countries, also reflected in the increased R&D spending by these firms 
(WIPO, 2011). Globalization offered an array of opportunities for the more able firms 
that were already actively looking for technology. 
Some writers have drawn comparisons between the globalization of the 1980s and the 
globalization that occurred a century earlier, starting in the 1880s. This previous 
globalization saw the economic emergence of the Atlantic economies, particularly the 
United States. While Rosenberg (1976) and Standage (1998) have highlighted the 
importance of technological changes -- the growth of the railway, emergence of machine 
tools  and mechanical engineering -- in enhancing productivity growth, O’Rourke and 
Williamson (1999) place far more emphasis on the impact of falling trade barriers 
which led to an exceptional mobility of capital and labor.  As we noted earlier, the free 
movement of people was an important mechanism for technology transfer in the pre-
War period and this technology transfer directly contributed to productivity increases. 
One could seek similar gains from the globalization of the late 1980s, which went hand-
in-hand with the spectacular growth of information flows, especially via the internet. 
The internet had a dramatic impact on shrinking distance, making information more 
widely available and in enabling the globalization of ideas.  When scarcities in human 
capital threatened the pace of technological progress in the emerging technological 
sectors, many developed countries lowered the barriers to the immigration of highly-
skilled professionals (reminiscent of the way the repeal of Corn Laws enabled the 
availability of cheaper grain to support workers during the Industrial Revolution). 
These freer flows of information and skilled workers facilitated technology transfer to 
an extent unimaginable in the immediate post-War decades.  
Many of the skilled workers who filled the emerging gaps in human capital for the 
technology-intensive sectors came from middle-income countries such as India, China, 
Ireland, Israel and Taiwan. Arora and Gambardella (2005) show that these countries, 
having invested in human capital in excess of that warranted by the growth of their 
domestic economies, were typically the ones at the forefront of the nascent software 
industry in emerging countries. These migrant workers created diasporic populations in 
technology clusters, while still retaining close ties to their countries of origin. Saxenian 
(1994, 2006) argues that those who gravitated to technology clusters such as Silicon 
Valley in California were able to export the model of technology entrepreneurship to 
satellite cities around the world, especially in India, China, Taiwan and Israel.   
As we argued above, one major impediment to trade in technology was asymmetric 
information between technology suppliers and buyers. Fransman (1985) had found that 
one of the key factors constraining technology transfer had been the ability of firms in 
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developing countries to search for and pick the right technologies for their purposes. It 
was hard to acquire when buyers did not know which technologies were available, the 
best source from which to acquire their chosen technology, and when they lacked the 
tacit knowledge – the absorptive capacity -- to deploy acquired technologies. The 
information gap across international borders was bridged through increased mobility of 
labor, a dramatic reduction in telecommunication costs, and global expansion of the 
internet as a communication tool. Increased investment in domestic R&D by developing 
country firms, along with internationalization of R&D, enhanced the absorptive capacity 
allowing firms to adapt foreign technology. Examples include Tata, Reliance who built 
two petrochemical complexes in India with licensed technology and Hyundai who 
manufactured their first car with licensed automotive technology from the UK. 
Case studies of technology entrepreneurship offer insights into the use of knowledge 
networks. Consider, for instance, the case of Suntec, a Chinese company that produces 
solar panels. Its founder was exposed, as a student in Australia, to cutting-edge 
technology for photovoltaic cells. His start-up firm then licensed technology from 
Australia and the US in order to produce solar panels in China. Entrepreneurship in 
technology-intensive sectors often involved the use of proprietary technology accessed 
through licensing, but even that access relied on the emergence of formal and informal 
networks. 
There were other elements of globalization in the 1990s that may explain the rising 
trend in international licensing. First, during the mid-1990s, the rapid expansion of 
global trade had led to multilateral reforms such as the harmonization of TRIPS. This 
agreement forced countries to strengthen their IPR regimes, increasing the willingness 
of technology suppliers to license more valuable technology across countries. 
Branstetter, Fisman, and Foley (2006) show that moving to stronger IPR regimes was 
associated with greater intra-MNE technology transfers across nineteen IP-reforming 
countries; however, they could not discern any effect of strong IP regimes on trade 
between independent parties. Kanwar (2012) exploits the changes in the different 
components of the IP index to show that developing countries received greater imports 
of technology following stronger IP protection, mainly as a result of an expansion in the 
sectors of economy that were covered due to stronger IP. 
Stronger IPR regimes also boosted capital movements – both inward and outward.  
Hassan, Yaqub, and Diepeveen (2010) present evidence to show that TRIPS increased 
FDI inflow into developing countries. Strong IPR regimes favored the 
internationalization of R&D activity of developed-country firms. Many set up knowledge 
centres and research labs in developing countries to take advantage of pools of trained 
scientists. Consider, for instance, the research facilities set up by Microsoft in India, 
Ireland and Israel. Firms behind the technology frontier often have problems assessing 
the full value of a technology. In this context, strong IPR may induce more technology-
based M&A by giving control over the residual rights in technology investments 
(Athreye and Godley 2009).  
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5. Summary and policy implications 
Traditional thinking on technology transfer identified technology licensing and inward 
FDI as the two main channels for technology acquisition by developing-country firms. 
Empirical evidence suggests that the extent of technology transferred through these 
channels was limited. In the presence of the well-known asymmetries of information 
and other imperfections in the market for technology, licensing remained a weak 
channel. FDI from developed to developing economies could have strengthened 
technology transfer, but the precise technologies transferred were not the most 
appropriate for developing country needs, especially as developing countries were 
relatively passive recipients of technology transfer. In many ways both channels were 
adversely affected by similar factors: for instance weak IPR regimes in developing 
countries made owners of technology reluctant to transfer, whether through licensing 
or through FDI. 
In recent decades, firms in middle- and low-income developing countries have 
increased their technological capability and have become active seekers of the 
technology they need. A broader appreciation of technologies on offer and 
complementary investments in domestic R&D to better absorb acquired technologies, 
has made licensing a more viable channel than it used to be. With the wave of 
globalization that started in the late 1980s, trade in disembodied technology has 
boomed: more countries are now involved in cross-border licensing arrangements with 
increasing participation from developing regions.  
More recently, some large firms from developing countries have acquired technology 
through OFDI, typically via acquisitions of firms with a portfolio of technology products. 
Technology-motivated corporate acquisitions involve active search for the right 
technologies – firms must carefully select their acquisition targets, invest resources to 
integrate acquired technologies into their domestic operation. As such, OFDI is likely to 
prove a more promising channel for technology acquisition than the relatively passive 
inflow of technologies that accompany inward FDI. 
What are the policy implications of these new channels for technology acquisition? 
Developing-country governments must recognize the new modes of technology transfer 
and devise policies that enable their firms to take advantage of them. 
One set of policies must focus on improving the functioning of technology markets. 
Clearly, stronger IPR regimes and enforcement of those regimes are a necessary 
condition if potential licensors are to be persuaded to transfer their best technologies. 
But stronger protection for licensors needs to be combined with policies to improve the 
bargaining position of potential licensees. When it comes to pricing, technology buyers 
are often at a disadvantage relative to monopoly suppliers. If governments could 
maintain and publish registers on the value of technology transactions, the price 
transparency could benefit potential buyers. Publicly-funded intermediaries could act 
as brokers between technology buyers and sellers, as well as providing legal advice on 
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typical license contract forms, lowering the costs of transactions in technology markets. 
For instance, the Chinese government has actively sponsored international joint 
ventures to improve technology transfer. Chinese experience in this field merits 
academic scrutiny: key policy insights into how the Chinese were able to persuade joint 
venture partners to transfer technology would be invaluable to other countries. 
Policy should also be informed by a better understanding of the link between capital 
flows and technology acquisition. Where inward FDI has failed to transfer significant or 
appropriate technologies, there may be a case of dismantling fiscal regimes that 
encourage such FDI for its technology transfer. There may well be a case for 
encouraging inward FDI for other reasons, such as promoting competition in domestic 
markets, but that case should not be overstated to include the gains from technology 
transfer that may not materialize. In some cases, it may be more productive to 
encourage or even subsidize OFDI through sovereign guarantees. In many cases this 
might only involve the leveling of the fiscal regime between outward and inward FDI, 
correcting the inherited policy bias in favor of inward FDI.    
There are policy lessons for developed countries too. Policy makers in these countries 
have campaigned hard in international fora for the reinforcement of IPR regimes. This is 
often motivated by support for national technology champions rather than to improve 
the functioning of technology markets. Better-functioning markets for technology are 
especially desirable in ‘green technologies’ where the global environmental benefits of 
faster technological diffusion should trump any narrow national calculus of cost and 
benefit. Similar maturity may be necessary in the pharmaceuticals sector to reconcile 
the conflict between preserving incentives for R&D in discovering new drugs and to 
offer access to life-saving generics for poor developing countries. 
Developed countries have also shown considerable ambiguity in their policy toward 
corporate acquisitions by overseas firms. At one level, many developed country regimes 
remain eager to encourage inflows of FDI, especially when a combination of public 
austerity and unemployment places a premium on projects that generate domestic jobs. 
But foreign corporate acquisitions are quite often regarded with public hostility and 
political objections. Tata’s takeover of Jaguar and Corus, or the acquisition of the 
European steel giant Arcelor by Mittal faced a cacophony of complaints about potential 
job losses. Although these events are relatively recent to generate reliable evidence, the 
limited UK experience suggests that Indian and Chinese companies have managed to 
turn around previously-failing companies, often by commercializing their technology 
assets to sell in their home markets.  If this is a more general trend then technology-
seeking outward investments from developing countries may be a boon for developed 
countries.  It has long been said that Europe and the UK are good at invention but poor 
at commercializing those inventions into innovation.  Indian and Chinese firms may not 
know as much about technology as the European firms they are buying, but they may 
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